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Abstract 
An experiment utilising response time measures was conducted to test dominant 
processing strategies in syllogistic reasoning with the expanded quantifier set 
proposed by Roberts (2005). Through adding negations to existing quantifiers it is 
possible to change problem surface features without altering logical validity. Biases 
based on surface features such as Atmosphere, Matching and PHM (Wetherick & 
Gilhooly, 1995; Chater & Oaksford, 1999) would not be expected to show variance in 
response latencies, but participant responses should be highly sensitive to changes 
in the surface features of the quantifiers. In contrast, according to analytic accounts  
such as mental models theory and mental logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; 
Rips, 1994) participants should exhibit increased response-times for negated 
premises, but not be overly impacted upon by the surface features of the conclusion. 
Data indicated that the dominant response strategy was based on a matching 
heuristic, but also provided evidence of a resource demanding analytic procedure for 
dealing with double negatives.  The authors propose that dual-process theories offer 
a stronger account of these data whereby participants employ competing heuristic 
and analytic strategies and fall back on a heuristic response when analytic 
processing fails. 
 
Introduction 
In the study of deductive reasoning, the syllogism continues to be a useful 
test-bed for theories of deduction (e.g., Stupple & Ball, 2007). The competing 
theoretical accounts of deduction have tended to emphasise explanations of the 
analytic mental processes and representations through which deduction occurs – 
e.g., Mental Models and Mental Logic (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994), or 
explanations which argue that participants respond to deductive reasoning tasks by 
applying non-logical heuristics to the surface features of problems – e.g., the 
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Probability heuristics model (PHM) and ‘matching’  (Chater & Oaksford, 1999; 
Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995).   
Mental models theory posits an analytic account of deduction in the form of 
three processing stages: comprehension , description and validation stage. Putative 
conclusions are compared with alternative models of the premises, and if no 
counterexample can be found then conclusions are accepted as valid (Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 1991). Mental models theory argues that sources of difficulty in syllogistic 
reasoning are due to the number of possible models that can be considered at the 
validation stage and also the figure of the syllogism at the description stage. Both 
these sources of difficulty are argued to burden working memory and therefore 
increase the likelihood of errors.  
Mental logic theorists present a rival analytic account (e.g., Rips, 1994) that 
argues for deduction as a central cognitive facility, and suggest that formal rules of 
inference manipulate symbolic representations at the core of our cognitive 
architecture. These mental rules are applied in order to generate an internal, mental 
proof of a conclusion in the form of propositions and suppositions and, thus, make a 
valid deduction. The source of difficulty in mental logic theories is dependent on the 
number of rules required to complete the proof – the greater the number of rules the 
greater the demand on working-memory, and thus the greater the propensity for 
error.  
Surface feature theories can be contrasted to these theories of analytic 
processes for deduction. For example, Wetherick (1989, Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) 
argued for ‘matching’ as an explanation of syllogistic performance whereby 
participants select conclusions such that the quantifier is the same as one in the 
premises. Wetherick argues that participants will select the ‘most conservative 
quantifier’ (i.e. the one that accounts for the fewest entities No< Some are not< Some 
< All) and are more inclined to match when both premises feature the same 
quantifier. However, Wetherick (1989) points out that matching is not a method of 
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successfully solving syllogisms, but is instead a strategy that avoids the effort of 
doing so logically. He also argues that it is not adopted by all participants, and 
concedes that it may not even be applied by any participant all of the time. It is 
noteworthy that the matching heuristic proposed by Wetherick (1989) has been of 
considerable influence to the more recent probability heuristics account of syllogistic 
reasoning (Chater & Oaksford, 1999).  
Chater and Oaksford (1999) proposed the PHM of syllogistic reasoning 
arguing that participants solve syllogisms by engaging in a probabilistic judgement 
based on the quantifiers used. According to the PHM, when deriving syllogistic 
conclusions reasoners apply various heuristics that involve minimal computational 
overheads (i.e., they are viewed as being ‘fast and frugal’ in the sense of Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 1996). The most important heuristic for the current paper is the ‘min-
heuristic’ which captures the principle that a conclusion will take the form of the least 
informative quantifier in the premises, effectively this is a refined version of the 
matching heuristic presented by Wetherick (1989).  
Roberts (2005) presented a challenge to reasoning researchers by 
introducing an ‘expanded universe of categorical syllogisms’ through which to 
examine existing accounts of syllogistic reasoning.  A novel set of materials was 
developed to flesh out the traditional set of syllogistic quantifiers by supplementing 
them with single and double negations. One of the most interesting properties of the 
expanded set of syllogisms is that by adding negations to existing premises it is 
possible to alter the surface features of a syllogism without altering its underlying 
logic. Investigating the effects of negation on reasoning dates back to Peter Wason’s 
sentence-picture verification task (see Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), and has been 
popular in the context of propositional reasoning (e.g., Schroyens, Schaeken, Fias & 
d’Ydewalle, 2000), it has not previously been applied to syllogistic quantifiers (see 
Stenning, 2002 for an interesting exception to this). Therefore, a range of novel 
predictions for the expanded set of syllogisms can be derived from current theories of 
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syllogistic inference. The particular predictions that we are interested in here are 
those pertaining to the cognitive complexity of the quantifiers and also to the 
application of heuristic strategies such as matching. The goal of the present paper is 
to arbitrate between surface and analytic theories of deductive reasoning by 
employing negated syllogistic premises and traditional premises and measuring 
response-times and acceptance rates.  
It is well established in the reasoning literature that negated premises are 
more complex in propositional reasoning (Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993) and are 
associated with an increased inspection-time (Schroyens et al., 2000). Predictions of 
similarly increased difficulty for double-negated premises in syllogistic reasoning 
come from within the mental models framework. For example, Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1989) presented syllogisms with the quantifier ‘only’ , arguing that 1) only a’s 
are b’s is logically equivalent to all b’s are a’s, and 2) that syllogisms presented with 
the quantifier ‘only’ are more demanding than those presented with ‘all’ because 
‘only’ emphasises the negative information in the premise (given Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne’s example only criminals are psychopaths it is apparent that those people who 
are not criminals are not psychopaths) and therefore participants flesh-out the model 
to represent positive and negative information, rendering it more complex. This 
argument extends to include premises with double-negations, and we argue that 
participants would be similarly induced to represent instances of both positive and 
negative individuals in their mental models. From this it can be predicted that 
participants will have increased response-times and produce more errors for the 
double-negated problems.  
Mental Logic theorists explain the complexities that arise through double 
negations by specifying a mental rule that eliminates them (e.g., Rips, 1994). If 
participants require an additional mental rule to eliminate the double negations then 
we would expect increased response-times for those problems. However, if this rule 
is considered intuitive and basic then we would not expect a substantial decline in 
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performance (especially on simplistic reasoning problems requiring relative few 
rules). It is clear that equivalent predictions for both mental models and mental logic 
approaches can be made - therefore for the purposes of this paper they will be 
broadly characterised as ‘analytic accounts’. 
Analytic accounts can be contrasted with heuristic accounts whereby fast and 
frugal rules of thumb are applied to surface features to derive or evaluate a 
conclusion, and do not predict a cognitive load associated with negated premises 
(e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995). The proposal that 
participants respond to syllogisms by matching the quantifier in the conclusion to one 
of the premises has been tested, with contrasting results, using traditional syllogistic 
premises (e.g., Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) and also with the syllogisms using the 
quantifier ‘only’ (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1989), but has not yet been tested with the 
negations paradigm presented by Roberts (2005). Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) 
found evidence in opposition to the matching hypothesis by demonstrating that 
participants tended not to respond to premises including the quantifier ‘only’ with a 
conclusion including ‘only’. In contrast, Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) demonstrated 
a matching strategy in a substantial sub-set of participants (25 out of 71) using 
traditional quantifiers. They also criticised Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) arguing 
that ‘only’ is systematically ambiguous and not widely regarded as a quantifier.  
A strength of these double-negated syllogisms is that they allow for tests of 
the matching hypothesis without the potential for the logic of the premises to 
confound the responses (all premise pairs are logically equivalent and the only 
variation is on the basis of the surface features). Note also that according to 
Wetherick and Gilhooly (1995) these premise pairs will be particularly conducive to a 
matching strategy as both premises feature the same quantifier and that predicted 
responses from PHM will be identical for the same reason (Chater & Oaksford, 
1999). In the context of deriving predictions for this experiment will be broadly 
construed as surface-feature theories that offer equivalent predictions.  
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Moreover, Gilhooly (2005) has argued that when cognitive loads increase the 
tendency is for participants to employ less cognitively demanding strategies such as 
matching, therefore it can be predicted that there will be an increase in the frequency 
of matching responses when the more demanding negated premises are presented. 
We have argued that there is a contrast in predictions made by analytic and 
surface feature theories, and extend that argument to suggest that these accounts 
can be viewed as conflicting heuristic and analytic strategies within a dual process 
framework such as that espoused by Jonathan Evans (e.g., 2007, 2009). Evans 
(2007) argued for a default-interventionist theory, whereby heuristic responses are 
rapidly and routinely invoked, but with the opportunity for analytic processes to 
intervene to override heuristic responses. In contrast, in his more recent hybrid 
model, Evans argues for a preconscious ‘type 3’ process that can decide to respond 
heuristically without waiting for the analytic system to complete its process. Sloman’s 
(2002) model proposes a further alternative - that heuristic and analytic processes 
can operate in parallel with the conflict between systems resolved by the analytic 
system once the analytic processing has been completed. These accounts make 
differential predictions for the experiment here. Both the default-interventionist and 
hybrid accounts suggest that where heuristic responses dominate there will be little 
evidence of analytic processing; in contrast the parallel account would predict that 
there would be evidence of analytic processing irrespective of the dominant 
response. 
Finally, in terms of predictions relating to the validity of the syllogisms, it is 
argued that valid conclusions can be accepted as necessary without the exploration 
of falsifying models, whereas invalid conclusions require construction of an 
alternative falsifying model to be refuted (Hardman & Payne, 1995; Stupple & Ball, 
2007), Mental Logic theories argue that it is more time consuming to attempt to 
construct a proof for a fallacy than a proof for a valid conclusion,  Based on this 
evidence it is predicted that valid conclusions will be responded to more accurately 
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and with lower response-times than invalid conclusions. The mental logic explanation 
for such an effect would be that it is more time consuming to attempt to prove a false 
conclusion than to prove a true one. 
In order to examine these competing hypotheses an experiment was 
conducted to examine response-times and acceptance rates on a conclusion 
evaluation task in which participants were presented with traditional and negated 
premises and conclusions.  
 
Method  
Participants 
Fifty-six University of Derby Undergraduate students were recruited. 
Participants were aged between 19-45 years. None had prior knowledge of 
reasoning research. Three participants were excluded as they did not complete all of 
the tasks. 
Design 
 The study used a repeated measures design. Premise surface features 
(double-negated versus traditional), Conclusion surface features (double-negated 
versus traditional) and Validity (valid versus invalid) were manipulated. The 
dependent measures were conclusion-acceptance rates and response-times for the 
presented syllogisms. 
Materials 
16 one-model syllogisms were presented (in figures AB-BC and figure 
BA-CB). These were presented with valid or invalid conclusions and either with 
traditional quantifiers or with expanded quantifiers (Roberts, 2005). According to 
Robert’s notation they were in the moods A[aa] A[aa] and N[an] N[an]: All A are B, All 
B are C versus No A are not B, No B are not C. Conclusions were either congruent 
(both premises and conclusions were traditional or both were negated) or 
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incongruent with the presented premises (such that traditional premises were 
presented with negated conclusions and negated premises were presented with 
traditional conclusions). See table 1 for details. 
(Insert table 1 here) 
The content of all syllogisms was neutral, and involved arbitrary combinations 
of professions and pastimes. Problems were counterbalanced and content was 
systematically rotated through the different problem forms. Authorware 5.1 running 
on Windows PCs was used to present instructions and problems and to record 
responses and response times. 
Procedure 
 Participants were presented with the following computer-based instructions: 
“This is an experiment to test people’s reasoning ability. You will be shown 16 
reasoning problems. For each problem there will be three masked statements. These 
will be labelled ‘Premise 1’, ‘Premise 2’ and ‘Conclusion’. By clicking your mouse on 
the masked areas you can reveal the statements. For each problem you are asked if 
the conclusion given below the premises may be logically deduced from them. You 
should answer this question on the assumption that the two premises are, in fact, 
true. You may revisit each of the three masked areas as many times as you wish 
although you cannot view more than one area simultaneously. [An example problem 
was presented at this point]. If, and only if, you judge that the conclusion necessarily 
follows from the premises, you should click ‘Yes’; if you judge that it does not 
necessarily follow you should click ‘No’. Please take your time and be sure that you 
have the right answer before giving your response. After each trial a box will appear 
saying ‘Click to continue’. Do this when you are ready to proceed.  
 
Results  
A threshold alpha level of .05 was set for the analyses.   
Conclusion Acceptance Rate 
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 A repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted on conclusion 
acceptance rates. Data reliably indicated that more traditional conclusions were 
accepted than negated conclusions (F (1, 52) = 6.77, MSE=.13, p = .012, p
2 =.12), .  
There was a near significant effect of Validity F (1, 52) = 3.95, MSE=.14, p =..052, p
2 
=.07, such that there were higher acceptance rates for valid conclusions than invalid 
conclusions.  
(Table 2 here) 
However, the most clear-cut finding was a reliable interaction between 
Premise Format and Conclusion Format, F (1, 52) = 17.23, MSE= .16, p< .001, p
2 = 
.25, whereby the highest conclusion acceptance rates were found when the premises 
and the conclusion were congruent, with substantially reduced acceptance rates 
when premises and conclusions were incongruent. Specifically, post-hoc tests 
(Bonferroni adjustment) showed that fewer traditional conclusions were accepted for 
double-negated premises than for traditional premises (p=.003), more double 
negated conclusions were accepted for double negated premises than were for 
traditional premises (p=.001) and more conclusions were accepted when traditional 
premises were presented with traditional conclusions than double negated 
conclusions (p<.001).  
No other effects or interactions were significant (p>.05). The next largest F-
value was 3.08, however this was shown to have a small effect size (p
2 = .056). 
 
Response-times 
 Finally, there was a weak, but, significant interaction between the premise 
format and conclusion format, F (1, 52) = 4.50, MSE= .02, p = .039, p
2 =.08, such 
that while problems with traditional premises tended to be inspected less than those 
with double-negated premises this difference was moderated by the congruence 
between the surface features of premises and conclusion.   
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(Insert Table 3 about here) 
No other main effects or interactions were significant (p>.05). The next largest 
F-value was 1.79, however this was shown to have a trivial effect size (p
2 = .033). 
 
General Discussion 
The data presented here provide some support for predictions from both 
analytic and surface theories of deductive reasoning. The effect of negated premises 
on response times demonstrates a clear cognitive load induced by the negation 
paradigm; and is consistent with the predictions of the analytic accounts (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994). However, it is incongruent with heuristic 
accounts based on surface features where cognitively demanding strategies should 
not be the dominant process. In contrast the interaction between premise format and 
conclusion format on response rates offers strong support for a heuristic process that 
matches surface features of premises to those presented in conclusions (Chater & 
Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995). Note however, that this tendency was 
not significantly increased for more complex problems (in terms of negated premises 
or invalid conclusions), and does not offer support for Gilhooly’s (2005) prediction 
that more simplistic strategies will be employed as the complexity of the task 
increases. In fact, the interaction suggests a stronger matching effect for Traditional 
premises (82% of Traditional conclusions accepted, 56% of Negated conclusions 
accepted) than for Negated premises (74% of Negated conclusions accepted, 67% of 
Traditional conclusions). These data are congruent with the notion that an increase in 
analytic processing results in a reduction in matching responses.  
Acceptance rates did not show reliable evidence of logical competence - 
there was only a weak, near-significant, tendency for participants to identify valid 
conclusions at better than chance levels, Moreover, the fact that traditional 
conclusions were more readily accepted than negated conclusions may have 
indicated a general aversion to the negated conclusions, which suggests that a 
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proportion of the participants were unaware of the logical consistency between A[aa] 
A[aa] and N[an] N[an] conclusions. However, the lack of an interaction between 
validity and conclusion format suggests that neither the misinterpretation of All A are 
C as equivalent to All C are A, or a failure to translate double negated conclusion 
dominates as a source of error.   
Mental models theory was congruent with the response-time data, assuming 
either that double negated premises induce the representation of negative instances 
that Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) argue occur for the quantifier ‘only’. Moreover, 
models based predictions about conclusion validity and response-times were again 
replicated successfully. However, the data contradicted the mental models theorists 
claims in opposition to matching from Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) because 
acceptance rate data are very much supportive of this heuristic strategy. 
Mental Logic theories fair similarly to mental models theory. The response-
time data is readily accounted for because the double-negated premise require the 
application of a double-negation elimination procedure which adds another inference 
rule to the proof – which, in turn, would increase response-times for the task. 
Moreover, it is more time consuming to attempt to derive a proof for an invalid 
conclusion (as no proof exists) than it is to prove a valid conclusion. However, the 
acceptance rate data are similarly problematic as for mental models theory. Many 
participants would appear to be lacking a double-negation elimination rule which 
suggests that it is not an ‘intuitively obvious deduction’ Rips (1994, p. 112-113).    
The surface feature accounts would appear to have the opposite problem – 
they can readily account for the broad trends in the acceptance rate data through the 
application of a matching or min heuristic, but struggle to account for the clear-cut 
impact of double negations on response-times - a quick and dirty heuristic process 
should not take longer to apply to either type of premise. Therefore the data would 
seem most readily accounted for with a dual process theory positing competing 
heuristic and analytic processes.  
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 The data are most clearly supportive of Sloman’s (2002) account  whereby a 
matching/min heuristic response competes with (and defeats) the slower analytic 
process (which is engaged sufficiently to demonstrate systematic differences in 
response time between the formats to indicate the greater complexity for double 
negated premises, but not to win out over the heuristic response). Stupple and Ball 
(2008) presented evidence for a parallel dual process model for belief biased 
syllogisms using the methodology presented here that suggested that a belief-based 
heuristic and an analytic process proceeded in parallel competition. 
There is little support for a default-interventionist account principally because 
the heuristic-analytic process advocated in this model appears reversed in the data 
presented here – the dominant process was analytic, but the dominant responses 
were heuristic. The Hybrid model presented by Evans (2009) receives some, albeit 
relatively weak, support in the current data set. This account suggests that where the 
heuristic response is given there will be little evidence of analytic processing (which 
was not the dominant process characterised here). Moreover, it would appear that 
the participants, if not engaging in processes competing in parallel, were prioritising 
analytic processing Nonetheless, there was some support for the notion of a 
preconscious conflict detection process - there were faster response times to the 
premises that matched their conclusions  which would be expected if a preconscious 
process were selecting problems with a premise – conclusion mismatch as requiring 
further analysis. Note however, that this evidence in favour of the hybrid account 
needs to be considered with the caveat that this interaction had a small effect size 
(p
2 =.08).  
In summary, these data demonstrated evidence of a matching/min heuristic 
dominating the responses in a conclusion evaluation task and evidence contradictory 
to that presented by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1989) in dismissing matching as a 
significant response bias. The materials allowed the control of logic and matching 
independently, such that the matching heuristic could be observed without logic as a 
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confounding variable. Moreover, we argue that explanations based on surface 
features (matching or PHM) that do not include a substantial role (in more than a 
minority of participants) for a cognitively demanding analytic process - such as 
mental models or rules - are incomplete as explanations of the current data set. We 
argue instead that the data are best explained within a dual process framework. It is 
suggested that the evidence favours a hybrid account (Evans, 2009) or a parallel 
processing account (2002) rather than a default-interventionist theory (e.g., Evans, 
2007). Further investigation is required to better arbitrate between parallel and hybrid 
accounts. 
Furthermore the data presented here underscore the necessity of moving 
away from manipulating reasoning problem inputs and measuring the participant 
response outputs towards incorporating fine-grained process-tracing methodologies 
because the heuristic-driven response data reported here would otherwise conceal 
underlying analytic processing, and without acknowledging both we cannot present a 
full account of deductive reasoning.   
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Table 1. Traditional and Negated Problem Materials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Percentage of Conclusion Acceptances as a Function of Premise Features, 
Conclusion Features and Conclusion Validity 
 Traditional Premises Negated Premises 
 
Traditional 
Conclusion 
Negated 
Conclusion 
Traditional 
Conclusion 
Negated 
Conclusion 
Valid 
All A are B 
All B are C 
Therefore 
All A are C 
All A are B 
All B are C 
Therefore 
No A are not C 
No A are not B 
No B are not C 
Therefore 
All A are C 
No A are not B 
No B are not C 
Therefore 
No A are not C 
Invalid 
All A are B 
All B are C 
Therefore 
All C are A 
All A are B 
All B are C 
Therefore 
No C are not A 
No A are not B 
No B are not C 
Therefore 
All C are A 
No A are not B 
No B are not C 
Therefore 
No C are not A 
 
          Traditional Premises         Negated Premises  
Conclusion validity   
Traditional 
conclusion  
Negated 
conclusion  
M  Traditional 
conclusion 
Negated 
conclusion 
M 
Valid 
 
89.6 59.4 74.5  66.0 78.3 72.2 
Invalid 
 
73.6 52.8 63.2  67.9 69.8 68.9 
M 81.6 56.1 68.9  66.9 74.1 70.5 
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Table 2. Mean response-times of problem components as a function of Premise Features, Conclusion Features and Conclusion Validity 
 
Note. ND  = natural data in seconds. TD = transformed data (Log of natural data) converted into original measurement units (seconds). Standard errors for the 
natural data ranged from 1.10 to 2.68, and from 0.03 to 0.04 for transformed data. Standard errors have been omitted from the table to aid readability. 
 
 
 
          Traditional Premises         Negated Premises  
Conclusion validity   
Traditional conclusion  Negated conclusion  M  Traditional 
conclusion 
Negated conclusion M 
 
ND TD ND TD ND TD  ND TD ND TD ND TD 
Valid 
 
13.52 11.64 15.51 13.40 14.52 12.52  19.22 16.22 18.63 15.10 18.93 15.66 
Invalid 
 
17.35 14.72 18.27 14.66 17.81 14.69  22.92 18.32 22.43 17.42 22.68 17.87 
M 15.44 13.18 16.89 14.03 16.17 13.61  21.07 17.27 20.53 16.26 20.80 16.77 
